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ABSTRACT 
I believe we are facing a critical time where innovative engineering design is of 
paramount importance to the success of our aerospace industry.  However, the very 
qualities and attributes necessary for enhancing, educating, and mentoring a creative 
spirit are in decline in important areas.  The importance of creativity and innovation 
in this country was emphasized by a special edition of the Harvard Business Review 
OnPoint entitled:  “The Creative Company” [1] which compiled a series of past and 
present articles on the subject of creativity and innovation and stressed its 
importance to our national economy.  
There is also a recognition of a lack of engineering, critical thinking and 
problem-solving skills in our education systems and a trend toward trying to 
enhance those skills by developing K-12 educational programs such as “Project 
Lead the Way”, “Science for All Americans”, Benchmarks 2061”, etc. [2, 3, 4].  In 
addition, with respect to spacecraft development, we have a growing need for young 
to mid-level engineers with appropriate experience and skills in spacecraft design, 
development, analysis, testing, and systems engineering. 
As the Director of Engineering at NASA’s Johnson Space Center, I realized that 
sustaining engineering support of an “operational” human spacecraft such as the 
Space Shuttle is decidedly different than engineering design and development skills 
necessary for designing a “new” spacecraft such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle of 
the Constellation Program.  We learned a very important lesson post Columbia in 
that the Space Shuttle is truly an “experimental” and not an “operational” vehicle 
and the strict adherence to developed “rules and processes” and “chains of 
command” of an inherently bureaucratic organizational structure will not protect us 
from a host of “known unknowns” let alone “unknown unknowns” [5].  There are 
no strict rules, processes, or procedures for understanding anomalous results of an 
experiment, anomalies with an experimental spacecraft like Shuttle, or in the 
conceptual design of a spacecraft.  Engineering design is as much an “art” as it is a 
science.  The critical thinking skills necessary to uncover lurking problems in an 
experimental design and creatively develop solutions are some of the same skills 
necessary to design a new spacecraft.  Thus, I believe engineers unfamiliar with or 
removed from design and development need time to transition and develop the 
required skill set to be effective spacecraft designers. 
I believe the creative process necessary in design can be enhanced and even 
taught as early as grades K-12 and should continue to be nurtured and developed at 
the university level and beyond.   
I am going to present a strategy for developing learning teams to address 
complex multidisciplinary problems and to creatively develop solutions to those 
problems rapidly at minimal cost.  I will frame a real problem, the development of 
on-orbit thermal protection system repair of the Space Shuttle, and step through the 
series of skills necessary to enhance the creative process.  The case study I will 
illustrate is based on a real project, the R&D Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) 
Repair Team’s development of on-orbit repair concepts for damaged Space Shuttle 
RCC nose cap and/or leading edges.  
Charles J. Camarda, Deputy Director for Advanced Projects, NESC 3 
IMPEDIMENTS TO CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
It may seem strange that I should begin a paper on the importance of creativity 
and innovation by first discussing what I believe are some of the key impediments 
to innovative thought, however, what might seem as obvious to many will be 
highlighted over and over again throughout this paper by examples, as causes for 
numerous delays and failures. 
I believe one of, if not the biggest, impediments to creativity is arrogance.  
When an individual who is highly competent crosses the line and becomes arrogant, 
that person stops listening, learning and growing and is not able to contribute 100 
percent to the team.  What can be said at the individual level is also true at the 
organizational level and can be much more damaging, especially if the organization 
breeds a culture which fosters arrogance.  Many of the solutions to current problems 
have been addressed in the past.  Researching what was done previously and 
viewing the problem through another’s eyes or perspective often enhances ones 
insight to the problem and often allows alternative ideas to come forward.  Fear of 
failure is another key impediment to innovation.  Failure is an option, a necessary 
option for creative solutions to problems and the acceleration of knowledge and 
research. 
I believe a strict allegiance to process, procedures, chains of command and 
rigid, hierarchical, organizational structure are other artifacts of a system which 
stifles the creative flow of ideas.  While this process and structure may be necessary 
in the final design stages of a project after final design and production; it will 
impede the conceptual design stage of a project to the point where it quickly 
exceeds both budget and schedule constraints and often results in the early demise 
of an otherwise promising project.  Hence, flexibility and freedom are critical in the 
early stages of the design process when creativity and innovation are so important! 
Time, schedule and resource constraints are often challenging to the creative 
process; however, a certain amount of pressure is also very helpful to encourage 
goal setting and to maintain a certain amount of focus for the team. 
Other impediments to creativity are: an environment or culture which 
suppresses dissenting opinions and tries to encourage consensus; a lack of objective 
critical thinking skills; an ambiguous or ill-defined problem and/or constraint set; 
and a limited participation of all the relevant discipline skills early in the conceptual 
design phase. 
OUTLINE 
Figure 1 is an outline of the steps involved in the creative solution of problems.  
The process begins with a very broad multidisciplinary view of the problem and the 
constraints.  Next is a very comprehensive review of all the necessary background 
information to obtain as complete an understanding of the problem and the critical 
discipline skills necessary to solve the problem.  The next step is the development 
of as small a team as necessary having the required skills to solve the problem and 
as large a team as necessary to complete the job within the assigned schedule and 
budget constraints.  Once a team is formed, it is important to develop an 
environment for collaboration, learning, efficient communication, teamwork, 
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respect, reward, recognition and the necessary tools for encouraging creative 
thought and problem solving. 
A Return to Innovative Engineering 
Design,  Critical Thinking, and 
Systems Engineering
Outline
• Problem Definition
• Background
• Developing the Team
• Encouraging Creativity
• Measurements of Goodness/Betterness
• Evaluate the Ideas
• Identifying the Mechanisms for Failure
• Strategies for Rapid concept Development
 
Figure 1. Outline of steps to encourage/enhance innovative engineering design. 
 
Techniques for problem-solving and concept development will result in a 
multitude of innovative ideas and concepts. These must be evaluated in a reasonable 
time to ensure success within the constraints and limitations of the problem.  When 
we are in the process of developing solutions/concepts it is then necessary to 
establish what I call “measurements of goodness/betterness” with which to point us 
toward developing and improving the concepts we have identified.  We proceed to 
identify the key unknowns and failure mechanisms of each concept and develop 
strategies for rapid development and technical maturation.  Once we recognize the 
resources required to fully develop and mature each of the concepts we iterate again 
and re-prioritize/re-evaluate all the concepts.  This iterative process is subject to 
change as our understanding and knowledge of the problem grows, and as even the 
requirements themselves may change over time.  The key to designing as robust a 
solution as possible is to factor in as many of the relevant concerns as possible early 
in the design process.  Then, develop strategies for minimizing risk based on our 
abilities to learn as we go and to conduct appropriate sensitivity studies to ensure 
we can remain well within our constraint boundaries. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION: “EVERY PROBLEM IS A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PROBLEM” 
I believe, to some degree, every problem is a multidisciplinary problem. 
Depending at what level you draw your dashed line around the problem or 
“system”, the number of disciplines involved can either be small or can become 
very large.  In fact, one of the current problems with using terms like “systems 
engineering” is that the intended meaning can be quite different depending on 
where this dashed line is drawn — at the level of fidelity of analysis and testing and 
the exact point in the design process.  For example, I contend that in the early stages 
of the design process, at the conceptual level, the roles and responsibilities of a 
“systems engineer” are different than what you would expect of a systems engineer 
at the later stages of the design development process where configuration 
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management, process development, quality control etc., may be more important.  
For the purpose of this report, I am going to qualify my definition of a “systems 
engineer” as a person who understands how the entire system behaves, how 
perturbations to that system effect its performance, and how interfaces between 
disciplines which describe the system’s behavior are coupled and can interact in 
totally unexpected ways to also result in non-traditional behaviors and failures.  In 
essence, the systems engineer has to understand the big picture (e.g., pan out), yet 
be experienced enough to recognize when the level of understanding or analysis of 
a certain behavior of the system is insufficient to adequately describe the physics of 
the problem and/or predict key failure mechanisms. It may sometimes be necessary 
to increase fidelity of the analysis of the behavior of the system, e.g., zoom in.  
There is a need for the systems engineers and the discipline experts to move in and 
out as members of the design team as needed providing a “flexible critical mass”, 
which changes as the scope of the project and/or focused problems occur and have 
to be addressed in a timely manner [6]. 
A good start at defining the problem is to describe the problem or design task as 
simply and completely as possible using “first principles” of science and 
engineering.  If the design task is truly in response to a previous design deficiency, 
then it is often necessary to determine the “root cause” of the discrepant feature in 
order to solve the issue as expeditiously and completely as possible.  If, on the other 
hand, the design task is truly the creation of a new concept or idea to satisfy a set of 
requirements and constraints, it becomes necessary to ensure there is a solid 
understanding of what the entire problem is and if there is any room for flexibility 
in either the requirements or constraints.  This process identifies the variables and 
constraints of the problem as well as the “objective” or “cost” functions and, thus, 
determines the feasible design space within which the designers are to operate.   
It is often helpful early in the process to have every member of the team write 
down what they believe is their perception of the problem statement and what they 
feel are the key drivers in the design.  Having each member of the team share their 
perspective enables each team member to learn to view the problem through another 
“discipline’s” eyes.  This helps to keep the team grounded as a single unit and 
maintains the overarching need to “zoom in” to understand the intricacies of a 
particular discipline and/or to “pan out” when appropriate so as not to lose sight of 
the big picture. 
When scoping what will be necessary to address the solution of a problem 
and/or a new design, the team needs to define the environment, including the 
human/operations side of the equation of applying the “right stuff” with the right 
approach.  All constraints must be identified including technical, schedule, budget, 
political, etc.  Identify all discipline skills necessary to solve the problem.  More 
often than not the non-technical issues drive the solution of the problem or the 
selection of the design concept.  Lastly, the team needs to identify the 
contradictions within the problem because it is often these very contradictions that 
will provide insight into the real innovative solutions which can offer significant 
design improvements. 
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STS-107 SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA TRAGEDY 
I will begin with the broadest definition of the problem and then zero in as 
quickly as possible to our piece of the problem and solution and show how it fits 
within the overall strategy of developing a successful strategy for return to flight 
(RTF). 
The cause of the Columbia tragedy as described in the CAIB report [5] was 
twofold: a technical cause determined to be a piece of bi-pod foam which liberated 
during ascent and critically damaged a section of the Space Shuttle wing leading 
edge; and an equally important social/organizational cause which allowed several 
critical social issues to develop which caused wrong decisions to be made and 
impeded the flow of critical information.  Figure 2 is the opening scene from the 
digitally-enhanced launch day video of STS-107 which shows a large piece of bi-
pod foam liberating from the External Tank (ET) of the Space Shuttle and hitting 
the lower surface of the Orbiter and breaking up into tiny particles after impact. 
 
Insulating Foam Separates from Bipod 
Ramp and Impacts Left Wing of Columbia
 
Figure 2. Launch video of STS-107 illustrating the impact of a large piece of 
external tank (ET) foam hitting the lower surface of the Orbiter. 
 
The RTF was a very difficult problem to address for several reasons: 1) we had 
to identify the root cause of the problem (the proximate technical cause for the foam 
being liberated from the bi-pod region of the vehicle), 2) we had to understand what 
was the impact damage tolerance of RCC material, 3) we had to understand what 
the survivability of impact-damaged RCC would be during earth entry heating, 4) 
we had to develop inspection and detection methods which could detect the 
minimum critical damage to the RCC leading edges on orbit prior to undock from 
the International Space Station (ISS), and 5) we had to ensure a “safe-haven” 
capability where we could use the ISS to sustain the Shuttle and ISS crews long 
enough for launch of a rescue Shuttle. 
While the development of an on-orbit repair capability was not necessary for 
RTF, in the view of many, including the members of the CAIB Commission [5], I 
considered it a high priority because it allowed us an opportunity to save the vehicle 
and/or the crew in the event of critical damage and a contingency with respect to 
our plans for a safe haven. 
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What we believe to be the proximate technical cause of the accident was that a 
piece of bi-pod foam (possibly as large as 2.2 lbs) was liberated from the ET at 
about 1:20 into the flight and struck the port wing leading edge of Columbia at 
approximately 800 fps (545 mph). 
About 84,000 pieces of debris from Columbia were collected across Texas 
weighing about 85,000 lbs in total.  Amazingly we recovered about 40 percent of 
the entire vehicle.  These pieces of debris allowed investigators to build a 3-D 
reconstruction of the port wing leading edge of Columbia which was one of the 
pieces of data used to develop an understanding of how the wing came apart during 
earth entry (see Figure 3).  In Figure 3, there are large sections of RCC panels 9 and 
10 that were not recovered. 
 
 
Figure 3. Debris reconstruction of a section of Columbia’s RCC port wing leading 
edge which was recovered after the tragedy. 
A photograph of the inner surface of a port wing leading edge panel, shown in 
Figure 4, indicates there was a thin metallic film which was deposited on the inner 
RCC surface.  This metallic coating probably resulted from a breach in the LE panel 
which vaporized the Inconel 617 metallic TPS protecting the front wing spar and 
was then deposited on the cooler inner surface of the panel.  Hence, the leading 
theory was that the damage probably occurred on the lower surface of one of the 
port wing panels causing a hole to grow during entry, hot gas to ingress into the LE 
cavity, and eventually destroyed the vehicle. 
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Reconstructing the Left Leading Edges
 
Figure 4. Inner surface of port wing RCC leading edge panel with thin metal 
coating believed to be deposited during hot gas ingress to the wing cavity. 
 
As part of the Columbia Accident Investigation, a series of foam impact tests 
were conducted to understand the physics of the problem and to definitively 
ascertain if large foam impacts could cause critical damage to the wing leading 
edge.  The result of a full-scale impact test of a rectangular piece of BX-250 foam 
(1150 cubic inches and 1.6 lbs) traveling at 777 fps (530 mph) is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Large hole in panel 8 post test at Southwest Research Institute (SwRI). 
SCOPING THE PROBLEM DOWN TO THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL 
When you pan out and look at the entire problem from a RTF Team perspective, 
there was a multi-pronged solution strategy to mitigate risks to allow us to return to 
flight (Figure 6):  1) The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) would do everything 
possible to understand and mitigate the root causes of debris liberation, 
aerodynamic transport, impact and damage tolerance of the thermal protection 
systems (TPS);  2) The teams would develop both an inspection capability which 
could detect minimum size critical damage to the TPS and also detect impacts to the 
wing leading edges which could cause damage;  3) Minimize or eliminate debris 
sources; 4) Toughen the LE, if possible, to resist impact damage; and 5) Develop an 
on-orbit repair capability in the event of a contingency of the safe-haven or rescue-
vehicle backup. 
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Multi-Pronged Solution Strategy
Debris Liberation,
Transport,
Impact, and Damage to 
TPS
Problem Statement
Minimize/Eliminate
Debris Source
Toughen Vehicle
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Resist Debris Threat
Develop On-Orbit
TPS Repair
Capability
Inspection Detection
ISS Safe Haven
 
Figure 6. Multi-pronged solution strategy to ensure a safe return to flight (RTF). 
 
It became apparent as we proceeded in parallel paths with this multi-pronged 
approach that: 1) we would probably never be able to eliminate all sources of debris 
that could cause critical damage; 2) to toughen the leading edges sufficiently to 
resist critical damage would take too long and be too costly to design, analyze, 
fabricate and validate; and 3) a “safe-haven” and rescue vehicle strategy was 
possible, but relied on many parameters to be a completely reliable and robust 
concept. 
Hence, a strategy to mitigate risk further was to develop an on-orbit TPS repair 
capability which could be used in a contingency situation. 
ON-ORBIT TPS REPAIR  
In the beginning of the RTF program, there were several categories of both tile 
and RCC repair.  The tile repair categories were adhesive/ablative concepts that 
would fill a damaged tile cavity and mechanical “overlay” concepts that would 
include filling the cavity with fibrous insulation and securing a C-SiC cover plate, 
or “overlay”, and gasket which was secured with SiC fasteners to adjacent, 
undamaged tiles. 
In the category of RCC repair, there were several options initially evaluated 
which included (Figure 7): 1) an “overwrap” concept which were complete C-SiC 
curved panels specially sized to fit securely over each individual RCC panel (44 
total for port and starboard RCC leading edges); 2) “crack repair” pre-ceramic 
polymers such as NOAX (Non-Oxide Ablative Experimental) which were designed 
to be applied over small damaged regions (small areas of coating loss or small holes 
or cracks); 3) “Plug” concepts which were mechanical patches/plugs of C-SiC 
material which were secured through a hole in the wing leading edge (~1 inch 
diameter) by a high-temperature fastener; 4) a “patch” concept which was a flexible 
patch of high-temperature material which is cured in place and adhesively bonds 
over the damaged region of RCC; 5) filled leading edge cavity options; and 6) a 
separate set of solutions developed by an R&D team which provided an alternative 
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set of mechanically- and adhesively-attached RCC repair concepts that spanned the 
solution space from small cracks and holes to holes as large as 16 x 16 inches. 
 
On-Orbit TPS Repair Capability
STA-54
Tile “Goo”
Overlay
“Mechanical
Attachment”
Plug
“Mechanical
Attachment”
Tile Repair RCC Repair
NOAX
“Pre-Ceramic
Polymer”
R&D
Drilling & Tapping RCC
C/SiC Fasteners
Small Area Repair
Large Area Repair
Overwrap Patch
Others:
- Filled 
- Pressurized
 
Figure 7. Thermal protection system (TPS) concepts investigated. 
 
One of the purposes of this presentation is to demonstrate the utility of forming 
creative/innovative multidisciplinary teams to address complex problems in a 
timely fashion.  The problem presented is the development of on-orbit techniques 
for repairing RCC leading edges. 
ON-ORBIT RCC REPAIR  
In scoping down the focus of the problem/design challenge, I will discuss 1) the 
two concepts which were chosen by the Program to develop; and 2) the state-of-the-
art of these concepts prior to the first RTF mission, STS-114 (the NOAX crack 
repair material and the “Plug” concepts).  I will then elaborate on the technologies 
developed by the R&D Repair Team. 
Figure 8 pans us back out for a moment and allows us to view how the RCC 
Repair Project must fit within the overall strategy for RTF.  It looks at the total 
picture for RCC repair and shows the interfaces and interconnections to other 
ongoing RTF projects is critical.   
Figure 8 also attempts to illustrate the connectivity and integration of each of 
the various RTF activities associated with RCC inspection and repair (e.g., RCC 
inspection; impact threshold (damage criteria); non-destructive evaluation (NDE); 
damage assessment, aerothermal analysis and test; RCC repair; and effects of aging 
on RCC material properties). 
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Understanding the Big Picture from a Systems 
Engineering Perspective (RTF Example)
Inspection, Detection, Monitoring, Assessment and On-Orbit Repair – A 
Strategy for Return to Flight
 
Figure 8. Demonstration of an integrated approach to solving the RCC inspection 
and repair problem. 
 
What was sorely lacking during the RTF program was leadership which had the 
appropriate technical experience, development project experience and a true 
“systems” engineering understanding of this multidisciplinary problem.  Not having 
this leadership resulted in a number of false starts and set backs and excessive 
expenditure of scant resources.  
 In the “Individual Observations” Section of the Return to Flight Task Group 
(RFTG) [7], Messrs. Joseph W. Cuzzupoli and Richard H. Kohrs make the 
following statement: “The utilization of operational-type management and 
engineers made the RTF of the Space Shuttle difficult.  Nevertheless, the result was 
enormously positive for NASA.  They got there!”  Other RFTG authors [see 
Appendix A.2, ref. 7] were not as kind and noted “persistent cultural symptoms” 
which they observed throughout the assessment process:  “We believe that the 
leadership and management climate that governed NASA’s return-to-flight effort, 
was weak  in some important ways”…. “We believe these organizational and 
behavioral concerns are still pervasive throughout the human spaceflight program.  
“Yet while NASA leadership was focused on the 15 CAIB return-to-flight 
recommendations, they missed opportunities to address the enduring themes of 
dysfunctional organizational behavior that the CAIB and other external evaluators 
have repeatedly found”. 
This is where a Project Manager with a strong systems engineering background 
would have been most beneficial. 
BACKGROUND “ARROGANCE IS THE ENEMY OF CREATIVITY” 
The next phase of the creative process is background.  This is the collection of 
all the “background” information we can obtain related to the immediate problem 
and also to analogous or related problems.  This is very similar to a thorough 
literature search for a Doctoral Dissertation and can include relevant patent 
searches, literature surveys, technical contacts, etc.  We should seek analogous 
problems in related and unrelated fields.  In fact, one of the solutions presented 
herein, the Plug repair concept, was an idea that came from a different repair 
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problem for a different program.  We should look to other sources for “field 
repairs” which say the military uses to repair aircraft, tanks, equipment in the field 
under extreme conditions.  We could also look to commercial undersea repair 
activities as well as automated/robotic repair techniques.   
Arrogance can be the primary obstacle to creativity and innovative ideas.  For 
example, by limiting our search to only endeavors associated with “human 
spaceflight” and the misconception that only certain organizations that are familiar 
in developing hardware for “human” spaceflight are capable of designing such 
equipment.  Another way that arrogance impedes creativity is that assuming we can 
approach the solution of the problem with a “clean sheet of paper” and solve all the 
necessary differential equations from scratch without the need for looking at how 
other researchers have solved the problem.  By taking this myopic approach to 
problem solving, we miss the opportunity for viewing the problem from another 
person’s perspective.  Often when we do take the time to view the problem through 
someone else’s eyes we gain so much more insight to the problem, a better 
understanding, and often times a creative or new technique for solving the problem. 
When we collect all the relevant information about the problem and when our 
understanding of the problem and all its interfaces is complete, we can formulate a 
plan to attack the solution and make note of all the relevant variables/parameters 
and the necessary sensitivities of those variables which can help to guide the 
solution process toward improving the various concepts as they are proposed and 
developed. 
ROOT CAUSES OF RCC DAMAGE, DAMAGE THRESHOLDS, AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF A “CRITICAL DAMAGE” CRITERIA 
To understand how to repair RCC, we must first understand what is the impact 
threshold which initiates damage in RCC (both visible and non-visible (sub-surface 
damage, delaminations, backside coating loss, etc.)), see Figure 9.  Next we need to 
understand what constitutes “critical damage”.  For example, what types of damage 
can grow to critical size which will result in the catastrophic breakup of the vehicle 
during earth entry.  Once we understand what the critical damage size is for various 
locations on the wing leading edges, we must ensure that the inspection techniques 
we develop can detect the minimum amounts of damage as shown in Figure 8.  
Next we must identify what practical size damage we are willing to develop a repair 
strategy for and, thus, what size do we believe is a practical limit to shoot for in our 
development strategy. Lastly, are there any NDE techniques which we can use on 
orbit to assess the integrity of the repair once it is completed? 
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Understand the Root Causes and Thresholds of RCC Damage 
Initiation and Develop a “Critical Damage” Criteria
 
Figure 9. Understanding the root causes and thresholds of RCC damage initiation 
and the development of critical damage criteria. 
 
Next, we must develop an understanding of how the RCC material system is 
manufactured and the functions of each of the constituents of the system.  A 
comprehensive description of the design and manufacture of RCC and a detailed 
description of its constituents and functions is given in reference [8].  As shown in 
Figure 10, the RCC system is composed of a carbon-carbon (C-C) substrate whose 
primary function is to carry the load; thin SiC coating layers, inner and outer 
surfaces (approximately 0.030-inch thick each), to protect the C-C substrate from 
attack by oxidation; a Type A glassy sealant is used to fill the craze cracks, which 
are formed when the part cooled down after the SiC conversion firing (Type-A 
sealant is a mixture of Sermabond 487 sodium silicate solution, 1200 grit black 
silicon carbide powder, and ground WDF graphite felt); and the RCC is vacuum 
impregnated with activated tetraethyl orthosilicate (TEOS). The TEOS converts to a 
SiO2 glass during cure and serves to fill the internal porosity of the laminate and 
provide additional protection from oxidation.   
The RCC material is a very complex material system with various constituents 
which have various primary and secondary functions.  To develop a repair solution 
for RCC requires and in-depth understanding of this system. 
 
Charles J. Camarda, Deputy Director for Advanced Projects, NESC 14 
Understand the function/operation of the total RCC “System”
Coating + Substrate + Sealants (TEOS & Type-A)
 
Figure 10. The RCC material system. 
 
In addition to understanding how the pristine RCC material behaves under 
nominal conditions and use, it is also very important to understand the behavior of 
damaged RCC with respect to the environment of launch, on-orbit, and entry. 
As shown in Figure 11, RCC can exhibit many different types of irregularities 
due to either processing and/or damage such as: SiC coating spallation, 
delamination of plys, surface craze cracks in the SiC coating, through cracks and 
internal voids due to processing. 
  
Surface cracks in 
SiC coating
Potential for 
delamination
Through crack Other Typical RCC Irregularities
Types of RCC Damage Requiring 
Characterization
SiC coating
Spallation
 
Figure 11. Types of RCC irregularities and damage requiring characterization. 
UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT 
One of the first things we learned post Columbia was how little we really knew 
about the survivability of damaged RCC during entry.  Our understanding of what 
was considered to be critical damaged had to be modified based on a new 
understanding of how RCC with SiC coating loss from both surfaces, through 
cracks, and subsurface delaminations. 
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During entry heating, local maximum temperatures can rise over 2,960 degrees 
F in the highly heated region and can cause damaged regions of RCC to grow into 
through cracks and holes which may become critical.    
While conducting computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analyses of various size 
holes in RCC during entry to assess the possible causes of the accident, Dr. Peter 
Gnoffo of NASA’s Langley Research Center (LaRC), discovered that when flow 
occurs at an angle to the damaged RCC leading edge, the downstream lip of the 
hole experiences heating up to five times that at the stagnation region of the leading 
edge as shown in Figure 12. 
 
Heating Rates
Heating rates at the 
downstream edge of 
the hole are 5 times the 
expected heating rate 
and result in local 
radiation equilibrium 
temperatures of about
4840 deg. F
Understand All the Critical Parameters and the 
Sensitivities of these Parameters to 
Behavior/Outcome
 
Figure 12. Computational fluid dynamic (CFD) analyses of flow at an angle to a 
hole in a wing leading edge and associated increases in heating and temperature of 
the downstream lip of the hole. 
  
Results of CFD analyses of holes in leading edges by Peter Gnoffo showed that 
the stagnation testing currently in practice at JSC to define critical damage was non-
conservative and that flow at an angle to a damaged leading edge could cause 
heating approximately 5 times higher than the levels expected during the 90-degree 
stagnation tests.  This discovery by researchers at LaRC would cause the redesign 
of the testing approach used from the stagnation test samples (Figure 13) in favor of 
a newly developed “wedge” test technique which is shown in Figure 14. 
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a)  Stagnation specimen configuration in the JSC arcjet facility. 
 
 
b)  RCC stagnation test in the JSC arcjet facility. 
Figure 13. RCC stagnation testing configuration. 
 
 
Figure 14. Newly designed “wedge” test to more accurately represent flow 
conditions of repairs on a leading edge. 
 
Both the stagnation and the wedge tests would allow flow through a damaged 
specimen because, as reported in the next section, it was later discovered during 
early RCC damage assessment meetings [9] that coating loss from the front and 
back surfaces of RCC, together with delaminations within the substrate, severely 
limited the survivability of the damaged RCC during entry.   
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Prior to the Columbia accident, it was believed that the primary threat to the 
RCC leading edges and nose caps would come from micrometeoroid/orbital debris 
(MMOD) strikes while in orbit.  Hence, the bulk of damage testing at that time was 
for simulated small regions of front surface coating loss and small through holes 
caused by hypervelocity impacts of simulated MMOD (Figure 15).  Typical 
hypervelocity strikes did not result in significant delaminations in RCC material 
surrounding the impact site.  The damage criteria prior to STS-107 called for a 
minimum hole of 0.25 inches.  Small areas of coating loss on the front surface were 
not considered critical and, as evidenced by arcjet testing in the Atmospheric 
Reentry and Structures Evaluation Facility (ARMSEF) at JSC, were survivable.  An 
example of a typical simulated MMOD impacted specimen to be tested in the arcjet 
is shown in Figure 16 [13].  Some tests were conducted with various levels of 
backside coating loss from 0 to about .426 inches x .44 inches.  Results of those 
tests indicate that backside coating loss can cause flow through the specimen adding 
additional energy to the substrate, raising the peak temperatures and mass loss to 
critical levels [10]. 
 
 
Figure 15. Simulated micrometeoroid-impacted RCC specimens prior to 90-degree 
stagnation testing in the JSC arcjet. 
 
Further damage tolerance testing with simulated (in lieu of real impacted 
specimens) through cracks (saw cut through specimen) and with static indentations 
(used to simulate ballistic impact with debris) to simulate regions of coating 
damage/loss and subsurface delaminations was also conducted in the arcjet facility 
[14].  Results of those tests verified the downstream heating of a crack/hole lip as 
predicted by Gnoffo [ 9] and as evidenced by the wedge-like nature of the crack 
growth when tested at an angle to the flow in the wedge holder design (see Figures 
14, 16 and 17).  When the crack thickness increases from 0.013 inches to 0.039 
inches the downstream heating of the crack lip is increased and a noticeable wedge 
shape hole readily forms.  Crack widths smaller than 0.01 inches, typically did not 
grow to critical size and were considered to have survived the full re-entry 
trajectory.  However, thin through cracks with coating and subsurface damage 
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(simulated by static indentation) did grow to a wedge-like hole of critical 
dimensions.  This was all new information which the Program needed in order to 
validate a robust criteria for critical damage. 
 
Figure 16. Effect of machined through slit thickness on arcjet performance of RCC 
specimen during a wedge test at JSC (flow is from bottom to top in the figure). 
 
 
Figure 17. Effect of machined through slit thickness, damaged coating and 
subsurface damage on arcjet performance of RCC specimen during a wedge test at 
JSC (flow is from bottom to top in the figure). 
STATUS OF RCC REPAIR CONCEPTS PRIOR TO R&D INNOVATIVE 
DESIGN WORKSHOP (JUNE 2004) 
Plug Repair 
One of the first recommended methods for repairing small holes in the wing 
leading edge was called the “plug” concept and it relied on a mechanical means to 
attach a rigid C-SiC patch or plug over the damaged region.  As mentioned earlier, 
the background investigation should look at work in analogous fields. 
One of these ideas for the plug concept was inspired by techniques developed 
by MSFC for repairing holes to the pressurized modules for the International Space 
Station using a Kit for External Repair of Module Impacts (KERMIt) [15] and 
shown in Figure 18.  For the KERMIt application, a toggle-bolt-like mechanism 
would be passed through the hole and a two-part epoxy filler would be pumped into 
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the hole and allowed to cure in place. Aside from the epoxy filler, this idea is also 
similar to a typical conventional home repair technique for a hole in drywall. 
 
 
MAJOR KERMIt ELEMENTS
ADHESIVE INJECTOR
SYSTEM
PATCH, TYPE 1
PATCH, TYPE 2
SURFACE PREPARATION
 TOOLS
Research Previous Work, Look for 
Analogous Problems
EVA Repair Methodology Proposed for ISS
 
Figure 18. Analogous methods for repair such as the Kit for External Repair of 
Module Impacts (KERMIt) served as an initial idea or starting point for the “Plug” 
concept for RCC repair. 
 
The KERMIt repair technique was developed to repair a hole in a previously 
pressurized ISS module which had to be isolated and, thus, completely 
depressurized.  An EVA astronaut would have to effect a temporary repair of the 
module during a spacewalk to allow the module to be pressurized and then a 
permanent repair completed from inside the module.  The EVA tools were 
developed and simulations were run in the Neutral Buoyancy Lab and in 0-g aboard 
the 0-g KC-135 aircraft at the Johnson Space Center as shown in Figure 19.  In the 
lower right of Figure 19 the two part epoxy flows through the hole and into the 
cabin in 0-g and provides a leak-tight seal for re-pressurization.  Tests were also 
conducted in glove box facilities at MSFC. 
The first plug concept proposed by ATK Thiokol after the initial Technology 
Exchange Forum (TEF) held at JSC from June 3-4, 2003 is shown in Figure 20.  
The original idea uses a flexible molybdenum spider, a threaded high temperature 
fastener, and silica cloth umbrella, a front face rigid plug and a port for filling the 
umbrella with an ablative material. 
Very early in the development stages, ATK Thiokol adopted a “torch” test 
technique to simulate the elevated temperature of entry heating at a very basic and 
material level. See Figure 21.  It is important to use prototypes and sub-element 
tests to fail and learn fast and furious in what Jack Matson terms “Intelligent Fast 
Failure” [16]. 
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KC-135 Aircraft
(0-g)
Testing
EVA Repair of ISS Modules using the 
KERMIT Repair Kit
Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL)
(1-g)
 
Figure 19. Testing of the Kit for External Repair of Module Impacts (KERMIt) in 
the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL) and in 0-g in the KC-135 aircraft. 
 
Spider constructed of molybdenum 
with a silica cloth umbrella
Filled umbrella insulated front 
patch configurations in Arc Jet  
testing drove patch 
temperatures to failure levels  
Initial Plug Concept
Inspired by KERMIT Repair Kit for ISS
Spring connects umbrella 
to front patch facilitating 
front-side application
Front face patch/plug
 
Figure 20. Analogous methods for repair such as the Kit for External Repair of 
Module Impacts (KERMIt) served as an initial idea or starting point for the “Plug” 
concept for RCC repair. 
 
Failure is an option, often times a necessary option in design.  However, failure 
to learn from our mistakes is not.  The need to test and fail and learn and test etc. is 
crucial for the innovative design process.  We learn so much more after a failure 
than a successful test and by doing so it often times stimulates the creative process.  
I equate “intelligent” in Dr. Matson’s terminology to mean that we develop 
reasonable building block tests to address critical failure mechanisms early and 
have the foresight to recognize when and how our tests do not simulate the actual 
environment.  Hence, do not discard concepts which may have failed due to non-
realistic test conditions. 
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Initial Screening of Plug Designs
Propane Torch Tests
• Fail and Learn Fast and Furious
• Identify and test for critical 
failure mechanisms early
• Building block approach
• Save time and money by testing at 
element/sub-element level  
Figure 21. Initial screening of plug RCC repair concepts using a torch test. 
 
Prior to June 2004, the ATK Thiokol plug design evolved to the concept shown 
in Figure 22. Because it was thick and thus rigid, it required over 1300 different 
rigid C-SiC plugs (to accommodate the variations in curvature of the various critical 
regions of the RCC leading edge).  In addition, it had a large step to the flow (> 0.1 
inches) and had a steep bevel angle.  The large step and steep bevel angle caused 
increased local heating and temperatures to rise above the active oxidation limit of 
SiC (3250 degrees F) and premature failure (Figure 22).  The root cause of this 
problem, however, was not discovered and corrected until the R&D Repair Team 
suggested conducting parametric CFD analyses as documented in a later section.  
The requirement for 1300 plugs also made this design very unattractive from a cost, 
schedule, and operations standpoint.  The Shuttle Orbiter would have to carry all 
plug concepts for the first mission and any stand-alone flights such as the Hubble 
repair mission.  
 
Initial Arc-Jet Plug Design
Required a Total of 1300 Plugs to Cover Entire LE
Considerable 
step and gap
Steep bevel 
angle
Very stiff C-SiC
Plug
Flow 
Direction  
Figure 22. Initial ATK Thiokol Plug design for RCC repair. 
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Hence, the status of the plug repair concept prior to the R&D Innovative Design 
Workshop was that none of the plug designs had survived the maximum design 
heating condition (peak temperature of 2960 degrees F) for more than a couple of 
minutes (the high heating portion of typical Shuttle entry lasts approximately 15 
minutes).  
CRACK REPAIR 
A category of methods for repairing minor coating damage, small cracks and 
holes in RCC on orbit, called “crack repair”, included materials which would be 
applied to the damaged area by an EVA astronaut and cure and adhere to the 
surface of the RCC.  The crack repair material which was downselected is a pre-
ceramic polymer called NOAX (Non-Oxide Ablator Experimental).  NOAX has a 
“putty-like” or “caulk-like” consistency at reasonable on-orbit temperatures and is 
applied manually using a caulk-gun-like applicator which has a vacuum-sealed 
container of the material as shown in Figure 23.  This repair method requires the 
EVA astronaut to use tools to spread and outgass the material while EVA and to 
spread and apply the material smoothly over the damaged region.   
 
Crack Repair Bag 
Provides insulated 
carrying case for Crack 
Repair Tools
EVA  Thermal Sensor 
Displays the temperature of RCC 
or Palette surface for correct 
application of NOAX-D
Crack Repair Gun   
Applies NOAX for crack 
repair
Crack Repair System Tools
 
Figure 23. EVA tools developed to apply the NOAX pre-ceramic polymer RCC 
crack repair material. 
 
The application is very dependant on the temperature of the NOAX and the 
surface to which it is applied and, hence, requires the use of a thermal sensor to 
monitor application temperatures. 
Once the material is applied to the surface, it cures during the normal day-night 
thermal cycles on orbit and then relies on the entry heating to convert the polymer 
to a ceramic material; thus, providing the high-temperature oxidation protection 
during entry. 
Prior to the R&D Innovative Workshop at LaRC in June 2004, there were no 
successful tests of any crack repair materials in an arcjet.  In addition, because it 
was extremely difficult to model this material behavior and predict performance, it 
would be necessary to conduct numerous tests for varying conditions with varying 
levels of damage to develop a comprehensive estimate of the probability of failure 
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and/or risk of using this method in the event of a contingency and eventual return of 
the crew with a damaged wing leading edge. 
One of the failure mechanisms observed during arcjet testing (Figure 24) was as 
the temperature rose to over 2800 degrees F, the material flowed and sheared off the 
surface.  Another failure mechanism was if the material was applied at too low a 
temperature and was too thick, small chips or “flakes” of the NOAX came off and 
resulted in a large step to the local flow.  The local temperatures at this step can 
become high enough (> 3250 degrees F) to burn through even a good section of the 
RCC with its SiC coating intact as shown in Figure 25. 
 
Arcjet Test of Crack Repair Material
 
Figure 24. Arcjet test of NOAX RCC crack repair material. 
 
Results of Arcjet Test of 
Crack Repair Material
 
Figure 25. Repair test of NOAX crack-repair material showing region where a chip 
of the material pops off and the resulting step causes local heating and temperatures 
to exceed the coating limit of SiC and subsequent burn through. 
 
The dashed blue circle in Figure 25 depicts a region where the 0.030-inch SiC 
coating was machined off the front and rear surfaces of the RCC specimen.  The 
solid red line depicts the region where a piece of the cracked NOAX coating flakes 
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off during the test and causes the bright linear indications in the top left and lower 
right.  These indications occur because the step in the NOAX material that remained 
was normal to the flow and produced excessive localized heating and eventual burn 
through of the specimen.  This highlights the sensitivity of the damaged and 
repaired section of the leading edges to slight protuberances to the flow and the 
complexity of conducting a successful repair on orbit. 
Figure 26 is a picture of astronaut Steve Robinson evaluating several of the 
newly developed tile and RCC TPS repair techniques in the payload bay of STS-
114.  
 
Tile and RCC Repair DTO
 
Figure 26. EVA astronaut Steve Robinson demonstrating several tile and RCC TPS 
repair techniques in the payload bay during STS-114. 
 
Figure 27 is a closeup of the NOAX RCC crack repair Detailed Test Objective 
(DTO) after the NOAX material cured after several orbits.  Notice that even though 
the material was outgassed and kept in a vacuum cartridge prior to flight, the 
material still can outgass and bubble up when applied on orbit if proper procedures 
are not developed.  The potential problem with such outgassing is that the porosity 
formed can fracture during entry heating and form defects which can cause 
excessive local heating similar to that exhibited during the arcjet test shown in 
Figure 25. 
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Closeup of Crack Repaired RCC Specimen
(STS-114)
 
Figure 27. Closeup of RCC crack repaired specimen using NOAX pre-ceramic 
polymer on orbit during STS-114. 
R&D RCC REPAIR TEAM INNOVATIVE DESIGN WORKSHOP  
(JUNE, 2004) 
BACKGROUND 
In early June it became obvious that the TPS repair teams were struggling to 
develop concepts for on-orbit tile or RCC repair.  We approached the Orbiter 
Project Manager with a plan for developing a team to go off and brainstorm for new 
ideas for solving the repair problem.  We hosted a small, 2.5 day innovative design 
workshop at NASA LaRC in June 2004.  We selected a group of key researchers, 
engineers, etc., from around the country and developed a very short workshop at 
LaRC’s Innovation Center.  It provided several rooms with floor-to-ceiling white 
boards, A/V equipment, computer capabilities, supplies, IT support and a facilitator.  
We organized the meeting to first review the current status of the RCC Repair 
Project; summarize the design requirements (e.g., cost, schedule, technical 
requirements, constraints, etc.); present a technology status with respect to several 
key disciplines (e.g., aerothermodynamics, thermal, materials, and structures, etc.); 
review the status of several key concepts such as crack repair and plug repair; 
present a short review of effective techniques for enhancing innovative thinking 
such as brainstorming and TRIZ [17]; facilitate several brainstorming sessions; and 
develop a strategy for cataloging concepts and paring down the list to a manageable 
size.  We arranged for keynote dinner speakers to help the team think outside the 
box and supplied each member with a copy of reference [17] to read prior to the 
meeting. 
DEVELOPING THE TEAM 
“Two heads are better than one, if at least one listens” 
Selecting and developing the team is crucial. One of the most important aspects 
of a healthy team is good communication.  I was very fortunate in being allowed 
much freedom in that I was allowed to hand pick each individual member of the 
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original team. Only one or two of my original candidates could not attend the 
kickoff meeting or workshop. The list of attendees is shown in Figure 28.   
Developing the Team
 
Figure 28. Attendees of the R&D RCC Repair Team Innovative Design Workshop 
held at NASA LaRC, 15-17 June, 2004. 
I believe it is important to have all the key disciplines and background experts 
available early on.  I also believe it is important that every member of the team is 
given the “big picture” and is allowed to see where his/her piece fits in that big 
picture.  I would also agree that it is important to keep the team as small as 
necessary and to have the required skills to solve the problem and, as a large team 
as necessary, to complete the job within the assigned schedule and budget 
constraints.  The number of attendees was about 23 people with areas of expertise 
ranging from thermal structures, materials (both metallic and refractory composite), 
high temperature seals, coatings, RCC, ablation, manufacturing, 
aerothermodynamics, structures, fabrication, etc.  In addition, I seeded the team 
with several out-of-the-box creative thinkers and two astronauts (myself and Dr. 
Donald Pettit).   
It is important to instill ownership, responsibility and accountability in every 
member of the team, ensure everyone has access to the big picture and develop an 
atmosphere where rapid learning of multidisciplinary skills is easy and accessible to 
all.   
What was amazing was that in 2.5 days we developed approximately 60 
concepts which we distilled down to a manageable size (approximately 12) in 
several weeks and had developed and tested several prototype concepts successfully 
in only three months time.  We applied for over 7 patents as a team of which NASA 
has chosen to pursue three.  The number of concepts grew and shrank over the 
course of several weeks as did the “flexible critical mass” of people who made up 
the R&D Repair Team.  I selected Dr. Steve Scotti from NASA LaRC to personally 
lead this team and the results and accomplishments of this team is the bulk of what I 
will present next.   
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ENCOURAGING CREATIVE THOUGHT 
“Everyone is a da Vinci” 
While it is very important to select a good team, it is also very important to do 
everything possible to enhance the creative output of that team.  We selected a 
setting for our initial meeting and workshop which was removed from the normal 
work setting and designed a number of non-technical presentations to help 
accelerate the creative process.  Conducting innovative workshops away from 
normal business or work settings and eliminating distractions is important.  A 
relaxed setting with social activities and opportunities for informal discussion is 
also helpful.  The atmosphere and environment you choose and the tone you set at 
the beginning or initiation of the project is very critical.  
 For creativity to flow there needs to be a universal recognition by every 
member of the team that “risk” taking is critical, there are no silly ideas and that 
“failure is not only an option but a requirement for success” is voiced.  The 
“permission to try and try again” as described by NASA historian James Schultz 
[18], or what I would like to call “permission to fail” is necessary in research and is 
also vital during the learning phase of concept development.  To quote Schultz: 
“Learning by repeated attempts may appear cumbersome, but failures indicated 
areas where further research was needed to improve the understanding of flight”.  
Jack Matson coins a term “Intelligent Fast Failure (IFF)”[17].  He describes this as 
a process by which you drive to experimentation early with rapidly developed, 
inexpensive prototypes early and fail and learn rapidly.  In his words “the faster the 
experimental phase, the more likely a successful innovation will result”.   
Fear of failure, I believe, is one of the biggest impediments to creativity and it is 
also one of the key impediments to each individual on the team from realizing his or 
her inner creative ability.  Often times the people with the most knowledge/ 
expertise are the ones most reluctant to look foolish in front of a group and, hence, 
often times need to be coaxed to accepting public failure and potential ridicule.  To 
draw the most from each individual team member early, the leader and/or facilitator 
must develop an environment where brainstorming “silly” ideas is encouraged.  
Often times by “flipping” the silly ideas around or blowing “conventional” ideas out 
of proportion we stumble on an insight to a novel solution of the problem at hand. 
Another important ingredient for creativity is time. In particular, you must allow 
time for unconscious thought in trying to solve the particular problem at hand.  
Once you develop a set of ideas, it is often very helpful to let those ideas gel or 
incubate.  After our first workshop, it took several months for ideas to morph and/or 
evolve before we were ready to focus in on a select set to pursue in the timeframe 
allotted. 
During the workshop I brought several pieces of hardware to stimulate ideas.  
Other members of the team did likewise.  The use of 3-D models and graphic tools 
are very helpful for stimulating creative thought.  Other “tools” used were 
techniques of conventional and accelerated forms of “brainstorming and using other 
ideas such as TRIZ [17].  TRIZ is a Russian acronym for Theory of Inventive 
Problem Solving.  It is a structured system or algorithm for inspiring creative 
solutions of problems which has been taught in Russia for over 40 years and can 
begin as early as the 5th or 6th grade of elementary education.  I distributed copies of 
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reference [17] to all members of our initial team to read prior to attending the 
workshop.  In addition, I solicited the support of a facilitator from the LaRC 
Innovation Center, Ms. Donna Phillips, to help keep things moving and to offer 
suggestions and insights as to how the process was progressing.   
R&D RCC REPAIR TEAM CONTRIBUTIONS TO RETURN TO FLIGHT 
OF STS-114 
 Prior to the initiation of the R&D RCC Repair Team, the SSP had expended 
considerable resources to develop on-orbit RCC repair techniques.  After over a 
year of effort by industry (Boeing, Lockheed, ATK Thiokol, etc.) and NASA, in 
June 2004 we had not yet survived the full entry heating profile of the highest 
heating location on the leading edge.  Both the NOAX crack repair and the plug 
repair concepts were failing wedge arcjet tests both at ARC and at JSC.  After the 
initial innovative design workshop of the R&D RCC Repair Team, a plan for 
developing a series of new ideas and concepts was put in place with the intention of 
developing and maturing a collection of tools for repairing damaged RCC on orbit 
with sizes ranging from small coating damage to large holes (~16 x 16 inches).  The 
various tools developed are shown in Figure 29. 
Drill/Tap Tools
Fasteners for RCC
RCC Panel Drill Tests
Prototype Torque-
Limiter Tool
Fastener Post 
Arc Jet Test
Flexible Plug Concept
Small Area Repair (SAR)
Large Area 
Repair 
(LAR)
Enhance Creativity and Innovation
(Return-to-Flight R&D RCC Repair Project)
 
Figure 29. Some of the tools developed for on-orbit RCC repair by the R&D RCC 
Repair Team. 
 
The relevant tools and repair concepts are summarized next. Then, I am going to 
illustrate the association of some of the TRIZ and brainstorming concepts that were 
used or that could be applied to understanding how and why these discoveries 
occurred.  I will also discuss how these ideas were adopted by the SSP and used to 
enhance some of the existing concepts (such as the plug) to develop a workable 
solution which was eventually flown. 
In less than three months the R&D team developed (Figure 29): 1) a series of 
drill bits that could drill and tap simultaneously through RCC material using the 
Power Grip Tool (PGT) used by the EVA astronauts; 2) C-SiC fasteners that would 
be used to either fill a small area of coating loss or a small hole and/or mechanically 
attach a SiC plug/patch; 3) a prototype torque limiter tool to be used by the 
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astronauts to prevent over-torquing and damage to the C-SiC fasteners; 4) a thin, 
doubly-curved, flexible plug called a small area repair (SAR) and flexible gaskets to 
repair moderate size damage or holes; and 5) a large, flexible C-SiC repair patch 
which could cover a very large hole in a wing leading edge (~16 x 16 inches) and 
which used multiple SARs to secure it in place.  The R&D team used a building 
block approach to simultaneously develop a set of tools or concepts that were 
matured sequentially and in parallel and which provided a capability to successfully 
repair larger and larger size damage.  All the components of this repair system were 
matured to the point of successfully surviving arcjet tests up to the SAR.  The LAR 
is still under development and the capability to test a full-scale mockup is 
impossible due to the limited size of current arcjets. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-ADVANCING STEP-TAP DRILL 
One of the ideas proposed at the initial Technology Exchange Forum in June 
2003 by Francis Schwind of C-CAT Corporation was to drill and tap a hole in the 
damaged section of the leading edge and to fill that hole with either a RCC or a SiC 
fastener.  Francis even carried a working model of his idea to the meeting.  
Unfortunately, the idea was never carried forward by the team.  The SSP team 
attempted to drill a hole in RCC, however, they found it impossible to develop a 
drill bit which could penetrate the SiC coating of the RCC.  
Some of the critical constraints to developing this tool were the fact that the 
PGT was limited to less than 25 in-lbs of torque and the normal force applied to the 
RCC surface had to be less than 5 lbs over a 10-sec application period.  This last 
constraint was due to a dynamic motion limit of the EVA astronaut in foot restraints 
on the Space Station Robotic Manipulator System (SSRMS) and the Space Shuttle 
being suspended by the Shuttle Robotic Manipulator System (SRMS).  Another 
constraint was that RCC material to use in the development and experimentation 
stages was in short supply and controlled by the Leading Edge Sub-System Problem 
Resolution Team (LESS PRT).  Figure 30 is a schematic diagram of some of the 
SSP Boards and the paths that are necessary to have decisions made.   
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Board Structure of the Space Shuttle 
Program
 
Figure 30. Schematic representation illustrating the complexity of the Space Shuttle 
Board process for decision-making. 
 
This is a very bureaucratic and structured process and all the power to decide 
the priority of RCC material resides in the LESS PRT which, immediately after the 
accident, had very little participation in RTF repair activities.  The LESS PRT 
interfaces the Board process at the top through the “Technical Issues, Problem box 
and also at the right through the TPS CCB (configuration control board box).  
Hence, in order for the R&D team to quickly obtain small pieces of real RCC 
material to experiment with, the team relied on key individuals such as Dr. John 
Koenig of Southern Research Institute (SRI), Francis Schwind of C-CAT 
Corporation, and Suraj Rawal of Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) 
who graciously provided specimens to test.    
Much of the preliminary design and testing was done in the garage laboratory of 
Dr. Donald Pettit.  Don flew on ISS as a crew member of the Expedition 6. Upon 
his return, he and I set out to conduct much of the preliminary testing in his 
garage/lab (Figure 31).  I want to emphasize that a key to the success of the repair 
effort was the ability to prototype concepts quickly and to experiment/test, fail, and 
learn rapidly.   
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The Unofficial RCC Repair Lab
 
Figure 31. The unofficial RCC Repair Lab (Don Pettit’s garage) (left to right Don, 
Dave Throckmorton, Charlie Camarda, and Woodrow Whitlow). 
 
A key “aha” moment occurred in our preliminary design and testing of drill bits 
and that enabled us to develop a strategy to breach the very hard exterior SiC 
coating.  Using a simple spring-loaded center punch, we were able to easily chip a 
very small hole in the SiC coating (after only 3-6 applications).  Once the coating 
was breached and the C-C substrate was showing, it was then very easy to drill 
through the RCC specimen.  Although most of the damage regions we would need 
to repair on orbit would already have substrate showing, it would also be necessary 
to drill through undamaged RCC to attach a LAR for example. 
We then enlarged our small team to include a skilled toolmaker from LaRC 
(Ron Penner) and went to a small machine shop to fabricate several of our initial 
prototypes.  The bits design was stepped to minimize the normal force necessary to 
below 5 lbs.  We conducted tests using the PGT to verify that we could drill and tap 
up to a 1-inch hole in RCC with less than 5 lbs normal force (Figure 32). We were 
also able to design, fabricate, test and flight certify a set of such drill bits in only 7 
months time from initial conception (Figure 33).  See references [19] and [20] for 
further details concerning the development of the self-advancing step-tap drill. 
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Development of Precise Drill and Tap 
Capability for RCC
 
Figure 32. EVA astronaut on STS-121 Mike Fossom using a power grip tool (PGT) 
and testing the self advancing step-tap drill bit on a spare RCC leading edge 
segment. 
 
RCC Drill Bits
 
Figure 33. STS-114 RTF astronaut Charlie Camarda with self advancing step-tap 
drill bits on orbit. 
DEVELOPMENT OF C-SIC FASTENERS 
Francis Schwind of C-CAT Corp. was responsible for the design of the C-C and 
C-SiC fasteners.  We experimented with many materials, layups, and head designs 
that would enable a captive tool to use to interface with the EVA PGT.  In addition, 
the design of the head had to have as low a profile as possible so as not to protrude 
into the flow and cause excessive local heating; yet it had to be robust enough to 
accommodate the torque required for securing the fasteners. One of the concepts 
developed is shown in the lower right hand corner of Figure 34.  Fasteners were 
designed to be used alone, with SiC washers, or together with the SAR and LAR 
concepts. 
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Initial C-C Fastener and 
Washer For Demonstration
C-SiC Fasteners with 
Captive Head Design
Development of C-SiC Fasteners
 
Figure 34. R&D development of C-SiC fasteners to be used alone (to plug small 
hole damage and/or in conjunction tithe the small- and large-area repair concepts 
(SAR and LAR). 
CHANGING THE PARADIGM 
It was very difficult to convince the Program that is would be advantageous to 
actually drill a hole in RCC to repair it.  However, when you think about it you are 
actually drilling out a region of damaged coating and/or substrate, which would 
have burned through during entry, and are replacing it with better material than 
what was there originally (in our case replacing the C-C substrate with a C-SiC 
fastener).  Not that much different from what a surgeon does on a routine basis.  Yet 
this was a very difficult concept for the LESS PRT and the SSP to accept even 
though the ATK Plug concept would require a 1-inch hole to enable the TZM T-bar 
to be placed into the leading edge cavity. 
As you will see in the next section, the excellent fit of the fastener, the ability to 
evaluate the integrity after installation, and the ability to provide a redundant 
locking mechanism (e.g., coating the threads with a Type-A glass) makes this idea 
an attractive option to the crack repair or plug methods.  Individual arcjet tests of 
small holes filled with C-SiC fasteners were conducted as a possible solution for 
small holes (e.g., those caused by micrometeoroids) which were too large for the 
NOAX crack repair material and much smaller that the 1-inch minimum hole size 
for the plug repair method.  The logic was such that it would be preferable to only 
drill a small hole rather than have to enlarge a small hole to a 1-inch diameter to 
accommodate the T-bar section of the plug. 
DEVELOPMENT OF FLEXIBLE C-SIC COVERS FOR PLUGS, SARS AND 
LARS  
One of the key drawbacks of the original ATK Plug design was that it was too 
stiff and required over 1,300, 9-inch diameter unique plugs to cover all the critical 
areas of the leading edge.  Several of the preliminary concepts the R&D Team 
developed were aimed at developing a highly flexible design which enabled large 
deformations and would flex and hug the curved RCC leading edge surface.  One of 
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the original embodiments, shown in Figure 35, was the use of multiple, very thin, 
curved C-C or C-SiC material which could be nested like “leaf-springs” to allow 
large deformations, and yet provide a large enough thickness to be robust and 
redundant and provide sufficient oxidation protection to the damaged RCC leading 
edge.   
Flexible Plug
Doubly-Curved Leaf-Spring Concept
• Multiple thin layers to increase overall flexibility
• Redundant layers
• Drilled/tapped precise hole and RCC or SiC
Fastener
 
Figure 35. R&D RCC Repair Team doubly-curved, thin shell, C-SiC leaf-spring 
idea for a flexible plug design. 
Another variation of this idea was just a single doubly-curved, thin C-SiC shell, 
shown in Figure 36, which, together with a thin flexible gasket, could provide 
redundant attachment means and a further mechanism for preventing flow under the 
plug and oxidation of the substrate. 
 
Flexible Plug
Doubly-Curved Shell Concept
• Precise drilled/tapped hole and RCC or SiC Fastener
• Single, thin, doubly-curved shell 
• Gasket for possibly redundant sealing and 
attachment means  
Figure 36. R&D RCC Repair Team doubly-curved, thin shell idea for a flexible 
plug design. 
 
The R&D Repair Team also submitted a patent application for the curved shell 
flexible patch concept [21].  However, the application was not approved for 
submittal by JSC’s Patent Office.  
To demonstrate the concept and to get buy-in from the SSP, I visited C-CAT 
and designed a curved shell concept out of C-C material. They were able to 
manufacture it together with a C-C bolt and a scrapped T-Seal (manufactured and 
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delivered in only 1 week).  This demonstrated that you could manufacture a “very 
brittle” C-C or C-SiC material to be doubly-curved and flexible enough to conform 
to a highly curved surface (see Figure 37).  
 
Flexible RCC Plug and Fastener Idea 
Demonstrated with a Prototype
Before Fastening
Highly Curved RCC T-Seal
After Fastening
 
Figure 37. Rapid prototype of a doubly-curved, thin RCC plug fastened to a highly-
curved RCC T-Seal and conforming nicely to the curved T-Seal shape. This concept 
was demonstrated to the Program on 9/17/04). 
 
A cross section of the R&D SAR concept complete with C-SiC fastener and 
flexible gasket is shown in Figure 38.  Notice the plug and gasket conform nicely to 
the RCC plate, and the threads of the C-SiC fastener and plate ensure a tight fit.  
Application of a Type-A glassy sealant on the threads of the fastener causes a 
secondary bond and fuses the fastener in place during entry heating.  This can serve 
as a secondary locking feature for this design concept. 
 
RCC Flexible Plug
Doubly-Curved Shell Concept
 
Figure 38. Cross section of the R&D 4-inch-diameter, doubly curved, C-SiC plug 
and flexible gasket (small area repair (SAR) secured to a RCC plate using a C-SiC 
fastener. 
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The R&D Repair Team’s SAR design was a C-C or C-SiC 4-in.-diameter, 
doubly-curved thin shell which was fastened to the leading edge using a C-C or C-
SiC fastener.  A fit demonstration on the most highly curved Shuttle RCC leading 
edge was performed and is shown in Figure 39. As shown in the figure, the SAR 
covers a radius of curvature of ~3 inches and all locations exhibited a maximum 
edge gap of only 0.01 for a single SAR cover design. 
 
 
Figure 39. Fit check of the R&D RCC Repair Team’s 4-inch diameter doubly 
curved, C-SiC small area repair (SAR) concept on the most highly curved Orbiter 
RCC leading edge. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF RAPID PROTOTYPING AND RAPID CONCEPT 
DEVELOPMENT 
The term “rapid concept development” is a term I coined to describe the 
practical application of ideas such as intelligent fast failure [16].  This, combined 
with a building block approach for test and analysis, incorporates knowledge of 
both concept behavior in relevant environments and potential failure mechanisms of 
each concept. 
The schematic diagram in Figure 40 illustrates the number of various concepts 
which were tested and analyzed to arrive at the selection of one of the final designs 
for the SAR concept.  The R&D team evaluated: high temperature metallic, 
ceramic, and filled ceramic and metallic screens and cloths for doubly-curved cover 
materials; metallic and ceramic screens and cloths for flexible gaskets; high-
temperature metallic and ceramic filled and unfilled fasteners; and various materials 
and designs for the self-advancing stepped-tap drill bit.  We were able to rapidly 
develop and fabricate concepts and prototypes and conduct torch (Figure 41) and 
drill tests using Don Pettit’s RCC Lab (Figure 31).  In addition, we were able to 
make use of the Langley HYMETS (small arcjet facility) facility (Figure 42) to 
obtain representative heat, pressure and temperature tests of samples at the small 
coupon size.  This was done quickly prior to having to be scheduled in the larger 
arcjet facilities, which at the time were heavily booked up evaluating other program 
concepts.  This methodology for testing proved very efficient and effective and was 
crucial for us to be able to develop a SAR concept, complete with drill-and-tap tool; 
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fastener; gasket; and cover in only three months time (lower right-hand corner of 
Figure 40) which survived full-scale arcjet tests. 
Using this strategy, we were able to evaluate many ideas/concepts rapidly and at 
very little cost to the Program. 
 
Developing Strategies for Rapid 
Concept Development
 
Figure 40. Schematic diagram of rapid concept development strategy which led to a 
working small area repair (SAR) prototype which survived full-scale arcjet tests in 
only three months time. 
 
Preliminary Torch Tests
 
Figure 41. Preliminary torch tests outside the Don Pettit Unofficial RCC Repair 
Lab. 
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HYMETS Small Arcjet Facility for 
Material-Sized Specimens
• Pressure, Temperature, 
and Heat Flux Simulation 
Entry Heating Test of 
Repair  Specimen
• Heat Flux > 700 BTU/ft2-s 
• Entry Profile 
• Rapid turnaround 
• > 6 runs per day 
• Low Cost 
 
Figure 42. The RCC R&D Repair Team made much use of the small LaRC arcjet 
facility called HYMETS to rapidly evaluate many concepts for the small area repair 
(SAR) RCC repair concept. 
 
Rapid Prototyping - The ability to rapidly prototype a working model to 
demonstrate the feasibility of a concept to program managers, who are not as 
knowledgeable technically or who may have incorrect pre-conceived ideas, is very 
important.  It demonstrates the simplicity and feasibility of the concept and goes a 
long way in gaining support.  After the flexibility demonstration of the C-CAT RCC 
doubly-curved shell concept (Figure 37) at an Orbiter Configuration Control Board 
(OCCB, see Figure 30) on 9/17/04, Kevin Rivers machined a “potato chip” C- SiC 
specimen shown in Figure 43.  This was demonstrated to the SSP and to ATK 
Thiokol on 9/23/07 that they could also fabricate flexible, singly-curved, C-SiC 
Plugs and reduce the total number of plugs required from 1,300 to less than 20.  A 
second patent was submitted for a flexible plug design [22]. This one was accepted 
by the JSC Patent Office for submittal as a patent to the US Patent Office. 
At the time the R&D Team was presenting their demonstration of a flexible 
ceramic plug to the SSP, the Program was seriously considering cancelling ATK’s 
contract to produce 1,300 C-SiC plugs because it would take too long and cost too 
much.  Hence, by incorporating ideas from the R&D Team, we were able to fix a 
problem with the ATK plug design and would be able to fly a set of 8 plugs on the 
first RTF mission, STS-114, in the event of moderate damage to the RCC leading 
edges during the mission. 
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C/SiC Flexibility Demonstration
C/SiC Flexibility Demonstration 
0.04-in.-thick
Approx. 2 inch radius
Approx 1/2 inch of deflection 
with finger loads
The plug cover plate deflects 
when pressed down in the 
center, flattens out  and 
conforms to the tighter radius 
of the RCC surface.
 
Figure 43. Demonstration of a singly-curved, thin, machined C-SiC specimen to the 
program and ATK Thiokol on 9/23/07. 
 
The final design of the ATK Thiokol 9-inch diameter plug is shown in Figure 
44.  The conceptual coverage of the “new” flexible plug design is shown in Figure 
45 for coverage of RCC panels 8-10. 
ATK Thin Plug Concept
 
Figure 44. Final design of the “new” ATK Thiokol thin, flexible C-SiC plug fro 
RCC repair. 
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Panels 9 and 10 Left Wing
Panel 8 plugs
Target Coverage for Panels 8-10
New Flexible Plug Design Results in ~13-18 Plugs for Total 
Leading Edge Coverage
 
Figure 45. Demonstration of coverage of ATK Thiokol 9-inch diameter flexible 
plugs for RCC leading edge panels 8-10. 
RE-DESIGN OF THE PLUG USING CFD ANALYSIS 
In addition to helping to develop a flexible plug to reduce the number, the R&D 
Repair Team was also responsible for identifying key aerothermal failure 
mechanisms early and recommending an analysis/test program to help redesign the 
ATK plug concept because it had been experiencing premature failures due to local 
heating caused by the local step height and plug bevel angle. 
At the very first R&D workshop in June 2004, Dr. Peter Gnoffo (LaRC) 
presented CFD aerothermal analyses of damaged RCC.  It was at that meeting that 
we asked Peter if he could provide parametric analyses of the plug with varying step 
heights and bevel angles.  Some of the results of Peter’s analyses are shown in 
Figure 46. 
 
CFD Used to Re-Design Plug
• CFD has been used to study 
the heating effects of a plug-
repaired WLE.
• Effect of overall protuberance
Analysis performed by Dr. Peter Gnoffo, NASA LaRC
30-mil stepped edge (Tmax = 3672°F)20-mil stepped edge (Tmax = 3438°F)
• Max acceptable edge step height
Step Height
Flow 
Direction
7° ramped edge (Tmax = 3016°F)
• Optimum edge ramp angle
Ramp Angle
 
Figure 46. CFD analyses used to redesign plug to avoid excessive local heating. 
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Hence, from Figure 46, you notice that if the step height of the plug is less than 
0.1 inch and the bevel angle is below 6 degrees, the maximum temperatures remain 
below the active oxidation limit of SiC (3,250◦F) and the plug will survive.  When 
Thiokol designed their plugs to these tolerances and specifications the results in the 
arcjet tests were successful (Figure 47). 
 
JSC Arcjet Test of C-SiC Plug
 
Figure 47. Successful arcjet test of a newly re-designed plug using the results of 
Pete Gnoffo’s CFD analyses. 
Large Area Repair (LAR) 
The last concept the R&D Repair Team examined and is still in the process of 
developing is the LAR.  The R&D team is the only group that is developing a 
concept for repairing very large damage (~16 x 16 inches) or hole in the RCC 
leading edge.  The idea is shown in Figure 48 and relies on the development of all 
preceding concepts described above related to the R&D development program (step 
and tap drill, C-SiC fasteners, gaskets, SAR, etc.).  The only piece remaining to 
develop is the large, flexible C-SiC cover.  The R&D team is currently in the 
process of developing this cover and, once complete, will have completed 
development of a full range of tools for repairing RCC on orbit from small coating 
or crack damage or holes to moderate size holes all the way up to very large size 
holes (16 x 16 inches).  While many of these concepts will not be “certified”, they 
will be available to use in a last ditch or contingency situation to either save the 
vehicle and/or the crew. 
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Large-Area RCC Repair
 
Figure 48. Demonstration of large area repair (LAR) concept and attachment means 
to repair a RCC wing leading edge. 
 
Ideas for mechanical attachment and repair of RCC which arose from the R&D 
Innovative Design Workshop in June 2004 were also helpful to inspire similar 
attachment and repair strategies such as the tile repair “overlay” concept shown in 
Figure 49.  The tile “Overlay” concept is currently in the latter stages of testing and 
analysis and is also flown on-board the Shuttle Orbiter for every mission in case of 
a contingency. 
 
Application of RCC Repair 
Technique to Tile Repair
 
Figure 49. Application of a RCC large area repair (LAR)-like concept for repairing 
large damage to the Shuttle ceramic tiles (concept called the “overlay” concept by 
the Tile Repair Team). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This current paper addresses some thoughts on developing high-performing 
multidisciplinary teams to creatively solve complex engineering problems.  The 
strategies for defining the problem; collecting relevant information and studies; 
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building the team; creating an environment which encourages learning and 
creativity; developing innovative concepts; evaluating those concepts; and rapidly 
prototyping, developing, and testing those concepts are discussed.  The techniques 
presented, are reinforced by a case study from the return-to-flight experiences of the 
Space Shuttle which had tremendous schedule, budget, and political constraints.  
The example problem or case study was the development of on-orbit concepts and 
techniques for repairing damaged reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) leading edges 
and/or nose cap.  The paper contrasts the methods used by the Space Shuttle 
Program (SSP) and its contractors to a much smaller team of researchers, engineers 
and technicians which formed the R&D RCC Repair Team.  By utilizing techniques 
presented herein, the R&D Team was able to develop working solutions for small to 
very large damage to RCC in a matter of months and for a very low cost.  The R&D 
Team applied for over 7 patents for their ideas of which three were selected to be 
submitted to the US Patent Office.  Some of the concepts which were developed 
include: a self-advancing step-tap drill for simultaneously drilling and tapping RCC; 
C-SiC fasteners to plug small holes and secure cover plates for larger damage; a 
flexible, C-SiC small area repair for repairing small holes (up to 3 inches); and a 
flexile C-SiC concept the only viable concept for repairing very large holes in RCC. 
In addition to the concepts described above, the R&D team was successful in 
developing a flexible C-C and C-SiC doubly-curved shell which was adopted by 
ATK Thiokol and helped to reduce the total number of 9-inch plugs from 1,300 to 
less than 18.  The team’s use of key discipline experts to help re-design the plug 
also enabled it to survive worst case entry heating.  The LAR concept also helped to 
inspire other mechanical repair concepts such as the “overlay” concept for tile 
repair. 
I believe the success of the R&D Team in accomplishing so much in so little 
time can be attributed to the leadership of Dr. Stephen J. Scotti and the hard work 
and collaborative, creative spirit of the key individuals who were part of the team. 
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